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ABSTRACT
Security technology is advancing at a remarkable rate. While advances in
security technology have the potential to help prevent gun violence and
terrorism, the same technology is also capable of intruding upon our personal freedom and personal right to privacy. Development of the “Patscan”
marks the beginning of new generation of weapons detection security technology. It is far more sophisticated than any weapons detection technology
to date and gives rise to significant constitutional concerns. Current Supreme Court jurisprudence has yet to address the Fourth Amendment concerns inherent within the government’s use of advancing security technology to search citizens of the United States. A narrow state action doctrine
complicates the issue by undermining the Fourth Amendment’s privacy
protections. This note is intended to fill the gap in the Fourth Amendment
conversation created by the emergence of the Patscan, while also illustrating the consequences of applying the exceptions to the state action requirement narrowly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“New technologies test the judicial conscience. On the one hand, they hold
out the promise of more effective law enforcement, and the hope that we
will be delivered from the scourge of crime. On the other hand, they often
achieve these ends by intruding, in ways never before imaginable, into the
realms protected by the Fourth Amendment” 1
When the Fourth Amendment was drafted and adopted, searches were physical acts carried out by a government agent rummaging through an individual’s belongings, entering an individual’s property, or requiring the individual to reveal objects carried on his person. 2 At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, law
enforcement would have had to physically stop an individual and demand to see
the contents of his pockets or bag to detect contraband carried on his person. But
today the ability to search an individual using advanced technology without any
physical invasion is becoming more and more of a reality. A variety of security technologies are available, or will soon be available, to both government and private
security forces and law enforcement officers. The familiar metal detector allows security personnel at checkpoints, such as in airports, to search individuals for metal
objects in hopes of preventing weapons from entering sensitive areas. 3 Handheld
1. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
2. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.’ (internal citation omitted) As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers,
and effects’) it enumerates.” (emphasis added)).
3. Michael Bernzweig, Understanding and Selecting Walk Through Security Metal Detectors,
https://www.metaldetector.com/learn/buying-guide-articles/security-use/underMETALDETECTOR.COM,
standing-selecting-walk-through-security-metal-detectors (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
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concealed object detection systems are available for police forces to utilize while
on patrol. 4 Security robots equipped with thermal imaging may detect suspicious
heat signatures given off by a person’s body, 5 which could be a weapon carried on
their person. Even security patrol drones can now be equipped with thermal imaging and microwave sensor technology, allowing them to follow and scan any individual within their patrol range. 6 Technology allows for a search that is far more
sophisticated than the physical inspection of an individual’s belongings envisioned
by the drafters of the Fourth Amendment. Because Fourth Amendment caselaw has
been slow to grapple with the constitutional implications of these modern technologies and devices, legal scholars have often stepped in to fill the gap. 7
The Patscan, developed by PatriotOne Technologies (PatriotOne), is an emerging weapons detection technology that makes the previously discussed technologies seem as crude and unsophisticated as the physical searches they were intended
to replace. 8 The Patscan is a device that does far more than indicate whether an
individual might be carrying a weapon. 9 It positively identifies whether an individual
is carrying a concealed weapon, describes what type of concealed weapon the individual is carrying with a startling degree of specificity, and sends the information to
all on-duty security personnel via mobile application, SMS, or computer interface. 10
The Patscan has the potential to revolutionize the appearance, perception, and efficacy of security checkpoints in a diverse set of applications. However, just like the
technologies before it, the Patscan will challenge our understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, creating yet another gap in Fourth Amendment caselaw.

4. Thermal Vision Concealed Object Detection, THERMAL MATRIX USA, http://www.thermalmatrixusa.net/# (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). These concealed object detection systems can be used to detect
a variety of threats to both the public and law enforcement officers, including explosives, firearms, flammable liquids, and knives. Id. The concept of a handheld weapons detection system or “gun detector” dates
back to the mid-1990s. See David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New
Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1996). For an in-depth discussion of the Fourth Amendment
implications of handheld gun detection technology see id. See also Sean K. Driscoll, “The Lady of the House”
vs. A Man with a Gun: Applying Kyllo to Gun-Scanning Technology, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 601 (2013).
5. See KNIGHTSCOPE, https://knightscope.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
6. Aerial Protection Service, APTONOMY, http://www.aptonomy.com/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2019).
7. See, e.g., Driscoll, supra note 4 (filling the Fourth Amendment gap regarding handheld “gun
detectors”); Michael Ferraraccio, Metal Detectors in the Public Schools: Fourth Amendment Concerns, 28 J.
L. & EDUC. 209 (1999) (filling the Fourth Amendment gap regarding the use of metal detectors in schools);
Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2016) (filling the
Fourth Amendment gap regarding police use of drones to conduct surveillance).
8. See Patscan CMR Data Sheet: Covert Weapons Detection System, PATRIOTONE TECH.,
http://sengex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Patriot1-Spec-Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019)
[hereinafter PatriotOne, Data Sheet].
9. Id.
10. See Overview: Patscan Product Demonstration Video, PATRIOTONE TECHNOLOGIES, https://patriot1tech.com/solutions/overview/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) [hereinafter PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video].
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This note is intended to grapple with the constitutional concerns raised by the
development of the Patscan and to fill the gap in Fourth Amendment caselaw and
literature that the Patscan creates. Part II of this note will provide background information on the Patscan itself by briefly describing its features and capabilities, as
well as comparing and contrasting the Patscan to current checkpoint security technology, such as metal detectors and millimeter wave scanners. 11 Part III provides
relevant background information on the current state of the state action doctrine
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 12 Part IV will then apply the state action
doctrine and current Fourth Amendment caselaw to the use of the Patscan device
in a number of common contexts, such as in airports, government buildings, high
schools, and sports stadiums, to evaluate the constitutionality of its use in those
contexts. 13 Finally, Part V will conclude and briefly discuss the need for judicial reevaluation of the trend favoring security over privacy when it comes to emerging
technologies and the Fourth Amendment, as well as the important role the state
action doctrine should play in protecting privacy in the 21st century. 14
II. BACKGROUND ON THE PATSCAN
According to PatriotOne, “P[atscan] CMR is the world’s most advanced technology for covert screening and detection of concealed weapons.” 15 PatriotOne
also claims that it developed the Patscan “as an effective tool to combat active
shooter threats before they occur . . . thereby diminishing the epidemic phenomena
of active shooters across the nation.” 16
A. What Makes the Patscan Unique?
The Patscan uses cognitive microwave radar technology to detect and identify
weapons. 17 Cognitive microwave radar works through the emission of microwaves
in the direction to be searched. 18 These waves bounce off the human body at a
different level than they do when being reflected off of concealed objects, allowing
the device to determine whether someone is carrying an object. 19 Once the different frequencies are received by the Patscan device, “sophisticated software algorithms analyze the data to identify any concealed objects.” 20 The system then compares the signal to a database of pre-loaded weapon patterns and, if the weapon
pattern is already present in its database, identifies the weapon to a high degree of
specificity. 21 The device not only positively identifies the weapon, but it also
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8.
16. Id.
17. See Patscan CMR: Cognitive Microwave Radar, PATRIOTONE TECHNOLOGIES, https://patriot1tech.com/solutions/patscan-cmr/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) [hereinafter PatriotOne, Patscan CMR].
18. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.
19. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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provides detailed information about the weapon when available. 22 For example, if
a gun is detected that matches one of the profiles stored in the Patscan’s database,
it can provide information such as the caliber of the firearm, the capacity of the
magazine, the barrel length, action type, grip size, and the type of metal the gun is
machined from. 23
The “cognitive” part of the process is that the device “learns” over time by
adding unidentified weapon patterns to its database as it encounters them. 24 Then,
the device will share the new weapon pattern data across the system’s network so
that all Patscan devices will be capable of detecting the new weapon type. 25 The
Patscan has an effective range of about two meters, making it most useful in entryways and high foot-traffic areas. 26
B. Patscan vs. Metal Detectors vs. Millimeter Wave Scanners
Because the Patscan is most likely to be used in applications similar to metal
detectors and millimeter wave scanners, its features are best described when
viewed in comparison to those security technologies. The Patscan is similar to metal
detectors and millimeter wave scanners in the fact that all three devices are used
to screen individuals with the goal of detecting weapons. 27 Similarities between the
Patscan and other stationary weapons detections systems end there, however.
Metal detectors are very effective at doing what they are designed to do, detect metal. 28 Metal detectors indiscriminately detect any metal object that disrupts
the magnetic field produced by the device as an individual passes through the scanner. 29 Objects such as gum wrappers, pens, key rings, metal eye glasses, and
22. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.
23. See id.
24. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17.
25. See id.
26. PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8.
27. Metal detectors are likely one of the first security devices that come to mind for many when
thinking about security checkpoints in airports and certain secure government facilities. Metal detectors are
commonplace security devices with a primary purpose of detecting metal objects that could be used as
weapons including knives, guns, and certain explosives. See Bernzweig, supra note 3. Millimeter wave scanners are full-body scanners that search for concealed weapons or devices using radio waves. See Markham
Heid, You Asked: Are Airport Body Scanners Safe?, TIME (Aug. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4909615/airportbody-scanners-safe/. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began implementing millimeter
wave scanners in airports in 2010 in response to the notorious underwear bomber debacle in 2009. See id.;
see also Michael Crowley, Beware “Underwear 2”: TSA Chief Offers Rare al Qaeda Bomb Details, TIME (July
19, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/07/19/beware-underwear-2-tsa-chief-offers-rare-al-qaedabomb-details/. For anyone who has encountered a millimeter wave scanner at an airport security checkpoint, they are “the ones you stand in with your feet apart and your hands above your head.” Heid, supra.
Unlike metal detectors, millimeter wave scanners also detect non-metal threats, such as plastic explosives.
Id.
28. See MARY W. GREEN, NAT’L INST. JUST., THE APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE USE OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
IN U.S. SCHOOLS 65 (1999).
29. See id. at 78–81.
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watches can all potentially set off the alarm. 30 Because many weapons such as
knives and guns are made of metal, metal detectors are also fairly effective at preventing weapons from passing through a security checkpoint undetected. 31
Millimeter wave scanners, on the other hand, are becoming more controversial as evidence of their ineffectiveness continues to mount. In response to a TSA
request for comments during its formal rulemaking process, many commenters expressed concern about the effectiveness of millimeter wave scanning devices at detecting weapons. 32 At least one report leaked from the Department of Homeland
Security’s Office of Inspector General in 2015 found that after the implementation
of these devices, the TSA failed to detect explosives and handguns 96% of the
time. 33 It is unclear how much of this failure percentage can be attributed to human
operator error versus the millimeter wave scanners themselves. 34
In contrast, the Patscan provides much more information than a metal detector and has a higher success rate than a millimeter wave scanner. Unlike metal detectors, the Patscan is capable of differentiating between benign metal objects and
weapons. 35 Also, unlike the millimeter wave scanner, which may be failing to detect
explosives and handguns up to 96% of the time, the Patscan has a “true positive”
rate of 91.6%, meaning that it fails to detect potential weapons only 8.4% of the
time. 36 The technology that allows the Patscan to positively identify concealed
weapons raises serious privacy concerns. The specificity of the information that the
Patscan can provide about a weapon is alarming. While a metal detector or millimeter wave scanner can merely indicate that an individual might be carrying a
weapon, the Patscan affirmatively determines that an individual is carrying a
weapon. The Patscan’s ability to compare information from the scan against a database will reveal a large amount of information about the concealed weapon being
carried by an individual. 37 For an individual legally carrying a concealed weapon,
disclosure of the intimate details about their weapon to anyone with a Patscan installed on their property may be disconcerting.
There are several other differences between the Patscan and conventional security technologies. First, the Patscan does not require a direct line of sight; meaning that it can be installed covertly in walls, desks, floors, and other discreet areas. 38
It follows then, that if installed discreetly the Patscan could potentially allow security personnel to electronically search individuals who pass by the hidden Patscan
device without their knowledge or cooperation. Metal detectors and millimeter

(2016).

30.
31.
32.

See id. at 78–79.
See generally id. at 65.
Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 81 Fed. Reg. 11364, 11376–77

33. See Aviation Security Challenges: Is TSA Ready for the Threats of Today?: Hearing Before the
Comm. of Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. (July 29, 2015) (opening statement of Michael McCaul, Committee
Chairman, R-Texas); Jennifer Scholtes, Price for TSA’s Failed Body Scanners: $160 Million, POLITICO (Aug. 17,
2015, 5:09 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/airport-security-price-for-tsa-failed-bodyscanners-160-million-121385.
34. See Scholtes, supra note 33.
35. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.
36. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17.
37. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.
38. See id.
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wave scanners on the other hand require the cooperation of the individual to be
searched because they must pass through the device to be scanned. 39 The potential
for covert installation of the Patscan also raises privacy concerns because individuals passing by the device likely will be unaware that they are being scanned. Individuals who are being unwittingly scanned by the Patscan do not have a meaningful
opportunity to avoid the search by choosing not to enter an area.
Also, unlike metal detectors and millimeter wave scanners, the Patscan does
not require human operators. 40 Since the Patscan does not require human operators, security personnel can be refocused to where they are needed most rather
than stuck with the tedious task of screening individuals as they enter a secured
area. This also reduces the potential for human error in the screening process,
which is a concern when using metal detectors and millimeter wave scanners. 41
Furthermore, the Patscan itself does not generate an image of the person being scanned, 42 but a USB camera can be attached to the Patscan to take a picture of
individuals who are positively identified as carrying a concealed weapon. 43 Metal
detectors also do not generate an image of the person being scanned, but millimeter wave scanners were initially quite controversial because of privacy concerns
raised by the detailed images generated of the body of the person being scanned. 44
Finally, there will likely be a price difference between the Patscan and millimeter wave scanners. PatriotOne has not yet provided pricing for a single Patscan
unit, but their promotional materials describe millimeter wave scanners as “expensive” and the Patscan as a less expensive alternative. 45 Millimeter wave scanners
have an acquisition cost of about $175,000 per unit. 46 Metal detectors are about
$10,000 per unit. 47 Depending on the price PatriotOne sets for Patscan, it may be a
cost effective alternative to conventional security technology.
Overall, when considering effectiveness and price, PatriotOne has positioned
its Patscan device in such a way that is likely to promote widespread adoption by
39. See Current Technologies, PATRIOTONE TECH., https://patriot1tech.com/threats/current-technologies/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
40. See PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8.
41. See, e.g., Scholtes, supra note 33 (discussing the possibility of human error contributing to at
least part of the 96% failure rate of millimeter wave scanners).
42. See PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8.
43. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.
44. See Julie Accardo & M. Ahmad Chaudhry, Radiation Exposure and Privacy Concerns Surrounding Full-Body Scanners in Airports, 7 J. RADIATION RES. APPLIED SCI. 198, 199 (2014) (explaining that the TSA was
pressured to change millimeter wave scanners to produce less exposing images).
45. See PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8.
46. BART ELIAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R42750, AIRPORT BODY SCANNERS: THE ROLE OF ADVANCED IMAGING
TECHNOLOGY IN AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING 3 (2012). While the acquisition cost of millimeter wave scanners
is about $175,000 per unit, that amount only reflects the purchase price. The annual cost associated with
deploying and operating millimeter wave scanners is roughly $655,000 per unit deployed. Id. at 3–4.
47. Security Magazine, Millimeter Scanning at Airports: Is It Worth the Cost?, SECURITY (Feb. 21,
2009), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/79508-millimeter-scanning-at-airports-is-it-worth-thecost-1.
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security forces around the world. Whether PatriotOne can successfully navigate the
many obstacles faced by businesses attempting to launch products into the global
marketplace remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the emergence
of the Patscan, and the technology powering it, has created a new gap in the current
landscape of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Having explained the basic features, design, and purpose of the Patscan, Part III of this note turns to the state
action doctrine and the current Fourth Amendment landscape.
III. BACKGROUND ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
There are essentially three main parts to a search analysis under the Fourth
Amendment. First, the challenged conduct must be evaluated under the state action doctrine, because most of the Constitution––including the Fourth Amendment––only applies to the government. 48 Second, if state action is present, it must
be determined whether the challenged conduct constitutes a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 49 Finally, if the challenged conduct is a search,
it will be evaluated for reasonableness. 50 Before explaining each of these steps in
more detail, it is helpful to highlight the debate over what exactly the Fourth
Amendment requires.
A. What Does the Fourth Amendment Require?
The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 51
The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses: the Reasonableness Clause,
which requires that searches and seizures be reasonable, and the Warrant Clause,
which, at a minimum, lays out the specific requirements of a valid warrant. 52 There
is an ongoing debate about whether the two clauses are intended to be read as an
interconnected whole or as two separate parts. 53 The warrant preference interpretation of the Fourth Amendment holds that the Warrant Clause is interrelated to
the Reasonableness Clause, and in addition to setting the requirements for a valid

48. See infra Section III.B.
49. See infra Section III.C.
50. See infra Section III.D.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. Cynthia Lee, Criminal Law: Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing
Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1413
(2010).
53. Id. at 1408–13.
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warrant, also implies a warrant requirement. 54 Under this view, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless a warrant exception applies. 55
More recently, another view that the Fourth Amendment contains two distinct and separate clauses, has regained some traction within the Supreme Court. 56
This separate clauses 57 approach to the Fourth Amendment was the competing
view to the warrant preference approach for the first sixty years of the twentieth
century. 58 Under this separate clauses view, the Reasonableness Clause and the
Warrant Clause are completely independent and separated by the presence of the
word “and” situated between them. 59 When interpreted under this view,
54. David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant Requirement, 96 B. U. L.
REV. 425, 427 (2016).
55. Id. at 426; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”).
56. Lee, supra note 52. At least one recent Supreme Court Justice Scalia, advocated that the
Court return to the separate clauses viewpoint. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and
seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’ What it explicitly states regarding
warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of their use.”).
57. The “separate clauses” approach is also commonly referred to as the “reasonableness view.”
Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81
MISS. L. J. 1133, 1139 (2012).
58. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582. In his concurring opinion in Acevedo, Justice Scalia briefly explained the clash between the warrant preference view and the separate clauses view before advocating
for the latter:
Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it
is of course textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of reasonableness. For some years after the (still continuing) explosion in Fourth Amendment litigation that
followed our announcement of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (parallel citations omitted), our jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone (internal citations
omitted). By the late 1960s, the preference for a warrant had won out, at least rhetorically.
(internal citations omitted).
The victory was illusory. Even before today’s decision, the “warrant requirement” had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator cataloged nearly 20 such exceptions . . . . Since then, we have added at least two more .
. . . Our intricate body of law regarding “reasonable expectation of privacy” has been developed largely as a means of creating these exceptions . . . .
Unlike the dissent, therefore, I do not regard today’s holding as some momentous departure,
but rather as merely the continuation of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been with us
for years . . . . There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds, and unless
the principles we express comport with the actions we take.
In my view, the path out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the first principle
that the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that
the common law afforded . . . .
Id. at 582–83.
59. See Lee, supra note 52, at 1413.
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reasonableness becomes the only requirement for a constitutional search and the
Warrant Clause does not require that searches and seizures be preceded by valid
warrants. 60 Instead, the Warrant Clause only limits the circumstances under which
warrants may be issued by requiring that warrants be based on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and listed with particularity “the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” 61
On the surface, the debate appears to be settled in favor of the Fourth Amendment containing an implied warrant requirement. 62 However, underneath the surface a trend towards requiring only reasonableness undermines the implied warrant requirement. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the growing number of exceptions
to the warrant requirement have rendered it nearly “unrecognizable.” 63 While the
Court has not expressly abandoned the warrant preference view, it has espoused
that “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness” with increasing
frequency.” 64 While doing so, it has continued to expand both the number and
scope of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. These developments lend credence to the argument that in more recent Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
cases, the Court only pays lip service to the implied warrant requirement before
ultimately evaluating the search based on reasonableness.
The debate has become even more prominent as modern surveillance technology has been increasingly adopted by law enforcement. 65 Because it has chosen
not to expressly adopt the separate clauses approach up to this point despite ample
opportunity to do so, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will change course
anytime soon. Yet, it also seems unlikely that the Court will diminish the warrant
exceptions that it has already created. The solution to this jurisprudential morass is
a topic worth consideration. But the lengthy discussion necessary to do it justice is
outside the scope of this note. 66 This note will analyze the constitutionality of
searches conducted using the Patscan through the lens of reasonableness, because
that is the direction the Supreme Court appears to be trending. 67
B. State Action Doctrine: Who Does the Fourth Amendment Apply To?
A preliminary question to ask when evaluating a set of circumstances through
the lens of a Fourth Amendment claim is: who must comply with its requirements?
The Fourth Amendment applies to both the federal government and to the states. 68
Generally, the Fourth Amendment only applies to actions of the states and the
60. Id. While a warrant is not required under the separate clauses view, the presence of a valid
warrant prior to a search or seizure still has an impact on the reasonableness prong of the Fourth Amendment search analysis. See infra Section III.D. (discussing the reasonableness of searches).
61. See Lee, supra note 52 at 1413; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62. See Acevedo, 580 U.S. at 582; see also supra text accompanying note 58.
63. Id.
64. See Lee, supra note 5752, at 1143.
65. Gray, supra note 54, at 429.
66. For a more in-depth discussion of the separate clauses and warrant preference debate see
Gray, supra note 57. See also Lee, supra note 52.
67. See Lee, supra note 52.
68. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies
to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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federal government, whereas, generally the actions of private individuals do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 69 This concept is known as the “state action” doctrine. 70 However, the actions of private individuals can become state action if the
actions fall within one of the exceptions to the state action requirement. 71 Conceptually, the state action doctrine is not difficult to understand. In application, however, it is much more difficult to determine when private conduct may become state
action. 72 There are two exceptions to the state action requirement that the Court
appears to have settled on; the public function exception and the entanglement
exception. 73 These two exceptions, when applicable, work to recharacterize the private party’s actions as “state action,” consequently requiring that the private
party’s conduct conform to the requirements of the Constitution. 74
i. The Public Function Exception
The public function exception in its original form appeared fairly broad in
scope. One of the first cases that helped create the public function exception was
Marsh v. Alabama. 75 In Marsh, a police officer arrested a Jehovah’s Witness in
Chickasaw, Alabama, a private company-owned town, for standing on the sidewalk
and distributing religious materials to people without a permit. 76 The town had “all
the characteristics of any other American town,” except that it was owned by the
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. 77 The Court reasoned that the company town of
Chickasaw was being allowed by the state of Alabama to oversee a community as if
69. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). Professor Donald Crowley explains
state action doctrine as follows:
The state action doctrine ranks as one of the more illusive doctrines of constitutional law. As
an abstract concept it is fairly easily explainable, but its application to actual situations is much
more problematic. As a concept of federal constitutional law, the doctrine applies to the notion that constitutional rights act as restrictions on government actors but not private individuals, businesses, or groups. Thus, the ban against unreasonable searches restricts government
intrusions into one’s personal effects, but does not limit the ability of a snoopy neighbor to
investigate your basement activities. While the neighbor might be subject to a trespassing
charge, he cannot be held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.
Donald Crowley, Student Athletes and Drug Testing, 6 MARQ. SPORTS. L. J. 95, 100 (1995).
70. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349–50.
71. See Crowley, supra note 69, at 103 (discussing the ways in which private action might become state action).
72. As one commentator from the 1990s put it, “State action is a sea in which everything else
floats.” C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 421, 422 (1993).
If state action is a sea, its waters are murky indeed.
73. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
74. See Sean D.G. Camacho, Can You Hear Me Now? Time to Consider Whether Cell Phone Providers Are State Actors, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257, 261–62 (2016).
75. Marsh, 326 U.S. 501.
76. See id. at 502–04.
77. Id. at 502.
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it were a public entity. 78 Creating the public function exception in perhaps its broadest form, the Court held that the U.S. Constitution was enforceable against the company town of Chickasaw because it was filling the role of a public entity. 79
Later, courts including the Burger Court and Rehnquist Court increasingly narrowed the scope of the public function exception. 80 In 1974, the Court held that the
public function exception applies when a private entity exercises a power that is
“traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State.” 81 In doing so, the Court narrowly applied the public function exception, holding that a private company providing electricity to citizens was not state action, despite heavy state regulation of the
industry, because the service was not one the state had “traditionally” and “exclusively” provided. 82
ii. The Entanglement Exception
The entanglement exception applies when the “state’s involvement with [a]
private party has been so pervasive that it significantly facilitates or supports the
challenged actions of the private party.” 83 For example, in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, the Court held that the state was sufficiently involved with a discriminatory private actor when it leased a business space within a state-owned
parking structure to the private actor. 84 The Court reasoned that the state’s placement of its “power, property, and prestige” behind the discriminatory actions of the
private actor were enough that the private individual’s actions could not be considered “purely private.” 85 While it is not always clear how and when the Court will
find a government actor to be sufficiently entangled with the actions of a private
individual, it is apparent that more government involvement is required than mere
licensing, funding, or regulation of the private actions. 86

78.
79.

See Camacho, supra note 74, at 260.
See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509.

“In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation
of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to
justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict
their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State
statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for
undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand.”

at 262.

80.
81.

See Crowley, supra note 69, at 102.
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974); see also Camacho, supra note 74,

82. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352–54. Interestingly, when laying out the traditional and exclusively
reserved state test in Jackson, the Court relied upon four cases where it had applied the state action doctrine
to private actors to hold their actions unconstitutional. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (election);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (election); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town);
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (municipal park).
83. See Crowley, supra note 69, at 102.
84. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716–17 (1961).
85. Id. at 725.
86. See Camacho, supra note 74. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972)
(holding that a state selling a liquor license to a privately-owned social club did not cause the state to be
substantially involved in the private discriminatory actions of the club).
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C. What is a Search for Purposes of the Fourth Amendment?
i. Evolution of Fourth Amendment Searches
The meaning of the word “search” as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court
has evolved over time. In its early decisions, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relied upon a property-rights based framework. 87 Under the
property-rights based framework, a search occurs whenever the government physically intrudes upon a constitutionally protected area, such as trespassing upon an
individual’s property to obtain information. 88 The landmark case from the propertyrights based era of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is Olmstead v. United States. 89
In Olmstead, the Court explained that for a defendant to show his Fourth Amendment rights were violated there must have been “an official search and seizure of
his person, or such seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.” 90
In other words, without a physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area such
as his body or home, there simply could not be a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
The property-rights based framework was the dominant framework for a period spanning from the late-eighteenth century when the Fourth Amendment was
ratified, up until the second half of the twentieth century. 91 In the 1960s, however,
the Supreme Court began to move away from the property-rights based approach. 92 By 1967, two cases, Warden v. Hayden and Katz v. United States, marked
what was thought to be the end of the property-rights based Fourth Amendment
framework. 93 While Warden was decided first, Katz is often regarded as the seminal
case marking the Supreme Court’s departure from the property-rights approach to
the Fourth Amendment. 94 In Katz, the Court tells us that “the Fourth Amendment

87. Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 23 (2015).
88. Id.
89. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (holding that wiretapping a telephone
line outside of a defendant’s house to intercept and listen to telephone calls coming from the telephone
inside the house was not a search because the wiretapping was done without any physical intrusion onto
his property).
90. Id. at 466.
91. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309, 320 (1998).
92. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 87, at 24.
93. See Clancy, supra note 91, at 320. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (eliminating the “mere evidence” distinction and rejecting the idea that property interests are the subject of the
Fourth Amendment’s protection); Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
94. See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L. J. SCI.
& TECH. 47, 55 (2014) (referring to Katz as a seminal decision); Seth Capper, United States v. Jones and the
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protects people, not places” and that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” 95 However, “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” 96 Put another way, privacy, not property, is the subject of the Fourth Amendment’s protection. 97
Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence in Katz gave us the test that has been
used for the last fifty years by the Supreme Court in determining whether a search
has occurred. 98 He said that the Fourth Amendment protects areas in which a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 99 The test for determining whether
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is twofold. 100 First, “a person
[must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.” 101 Second, “the
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 102
In cases following Katz, the Court further articulated the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” test, explaining that the test has both a subjective prong and an objective prong. 103 Until 2012, Justice Harlan’s two-pronged “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test was the dominant method by which the Supreme Court determined
whether a search had occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
ii. Reinvigoration of the Property-Rights Based Framework
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the property-rights
based approach. 104 The Supreme Court further clarifies in Jones that Katz cannot
have replaced the trespass test for determining whether a search has occurred because it is an “irreducible constitutional minimum.” 105 Instead, Katz supplements
the property-rights approach in cases where there has not been a physical trespass
but an individual’s expectation of privacy has nevertheless been invaded. 106 By replacing the property-rights based approach with the two-part framework from Katz
and then reviving the property-rights approach in Jones, the Supreme Court appears
to have come full circle in determining what constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. However, after nearly 200 years of attempting to define what a search
is, the Court is not just back where it started. Instead of the pre-1967 propertyrights approach being the only test for identifying a search, the Court now has two

Debate Over Warrantless GPS Surveillance on Vehicles, 2 ALA. C. R. & C.L. L. REV. 175, 179 (2011) (referring to
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz as seminal).
95. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
96. Id.
97. Scott-Hayward, supra note 87, at 24.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
100. Id. at 361.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland., 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); see also Scott-Hayward, supra note
87, at 25 (explaining that the two-part test from Justice Harlan’s concurrence “has become known as the
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test”).
104. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 87, at 25.
105. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
106. See id. at 411–12.

2019

THE PERFECT STORM: HOW NARROWING OF THE STATE
ACTION DOCTRINE, INCONSISTENCY IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT CASELAW, AND ADVANCING SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES CONVERGE TO ERODE OUR PRIVACY
RIGHTS

323

frameworks working in tandem to afford the Fourth Amendment’s protections to
both people and constitutionally protected places.
In sum, after Jones, a search has occurred either when there has been an intrusion upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy (Katz), or when the
government physically invades a constitutionally protected area for the purpose of
obtaining information (Jones). 107 A determination that a search has taken place is
only the first step in the analytical framework of the Fourth Amendment search
analysis, however. Once Katz or Jones has been used to determine that a state action does indeed constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the next inquiry is reasonableness.
D. Only Unreasonable Searches are Proscribed
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches, rather, it only prohibits
searches that are “unreasonable.” 108 Whether a search is reasonable “depends on
all of the circumstances surrounding the search . . . and the nature of the search . .
. itself.” 109 In other words, there is no talismanic approach to determining the reasonableness of a search. Instead, the Court must delve into the facts of each case
to evaluate a search’s reasonableness. The Court is not without guidance, however.
Through its precedent, the Court has crafted a balancing test for assessing the reasonableness of a search. 110 Under this balancing test, a search’s reasonableness is
evaluated “by balancing its intrusion on [an] individual’s Fourth Amendment interest against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 111
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s view of the Fourth Amendment’s
requirements may be evolving. 112 But under current Fourth Amendment case law,
“warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when they are
not.” 113 The best way to ensure the reasonableness of a search is to obtain a warrant and execute it properly. Ideally, the government would always obtain a warrant
before conducting a search. But the reality is that in many circumstances waiting
for a judicially approved warrant is not practical. Consequently, the government
conducts many searches without first obtaining a warrant. In acknowledgement of
the government’s needs to search some individuals without waiting for approval of

107. See id. at 407; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989);
see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
109. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537
(1985)).
110. See id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
111. See id. (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654).
112. See supra Section II.A.
113. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 573 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (explaining that the warrant requirement “is subject to a number of
exceptions”).
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a warrant, the Supreme Court has created nearly two dozen exceptions to the warrant requirement. 114
The reasonableness of warrantless searches hinges primarily on whether they
fit within one of the nearly two dozen exceptions to the warrant requirement. These
exceptions operate by tipping the scale in favor of the government when the Court
is balancing an individual’s privacy interest against the government’s needs. 115 The
exception tips the scale either by reducing the privacy interests of the individual or
by amplifying the government’s needs. 116 One such exception, the administrative
search exception, is likely to govern the use of the Patscan in some contexts. 117 Another exception, the special needs exception, will govern the use of the Patscan in
schools. 118 Discussion of the administrative search exception and the special needs
exception will be deferred to Section IV.C.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PATSCAN SEARCHES
Under most circumstances, use of the Patscan is likely to be found constitutional under existing Fourth Amendment caselaw. This is because a narrowing of
the state action doctrine precludes a full-fledged Fourth Amendment analysis in
many cases. In the cases that do survive the state action doctrine expanding exceptions to the warrant requirement, too much weight is given to the government’s
interests, all but ensuring that use of the Patscan will be constitutional. In the first
step of the analysis, the constitutionality of using the Patscan to scan people for
weapons will depend, in part, on the security personnel behind the machine. 119 If
the personnel using the Patscan are state actors, we move on to the second step of
our Fourth Amendment analysis. 120 If not, the scan will not trigger the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. 121 Upon a finding of state action, we must then determine whether a scan from the Patscan is a search. If so, the search’s constitutionality will depend upon its reasonableness. 122 If the scan is not a search, it will not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 123

114.
115.

See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582–83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619–20 (citations omitted):

In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search
or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however,
‘when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ When faced with such special needs, we have not
hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the
warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
See infra Section IV.C.i.
See infra Section IV.C.ii.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Sections III.C–D.
See supra Section III.C.
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A. Is Use of the Patscan State Action?
Whether using the Patscan to scan an individual for weapons qualifies as state
action will, like nearly every other aspect of Fourth Amendment analysis, depend
upon the circumstances. While the Patscan is still in the early stages of the product
life cycle and is not yet widely available, it is not difficult to conceptualize potential
applications for its use. Airports, schools, government buildings, sports stadiums,
large event venues, casinos, restaurants, private clubs, and movie theaters are just
a few possible applications. For the purpose of a state action analysis, the many
circumstances in which the Patscan might be used can be categorized into three
basic groups: purely private actors, quasi-state actors, and clear state actors.
The first category consists of circumstances where purely private actors utilize
the Patscan. Due to the possible applicability of the entanglement and public function exceptions, this category is the smallest of the three. 124 Only when the conduct
is purely private would use of the Patscan fall into this category. For example, there
would be no state action if an individual installed the Patscan at the front door to
his house. Use of the Patscan under these circumstances would not qualify as state
action because there is little to no government involvement. Home security is not a
service that has been “traditionally” and “exclusively” provided by the state. Nor
can it reasonably be argued that the state substantially facilitates or supports an
individual’s conduct when he chooses to purchase and install the Patscan. 125 Private
business owners installing the Patscan at their place of business would also fall into
this category if another private party owned the building or property on which their
business is located. 126 Private clubs, movie theaters, or restaurants all might fall into
this category. Unless the private place of business, like the restaurant in Burton,
contracted with the state or leased state property, it would be unlikely to qualify as
state action. 127 Thus, by definition, when use of the Patscan is purely private, it does
not qualify as state action and cannot violate the Fourth Amendment.
The second category consists of those circumstances where private actors are
using the Patscan, and the state is intertwined with the private actors in a way that
requires a state action doctrine analysis. The private actors under these

124. The entanglement and public function exceptions cause otherwise private conduct to be recharacterized as “state action.” See supra Section III.B.
125. Perhaps, it could be argued that the state facilitates the individual’s purchase of the Patscan
by building roads or encouraging interstate commerce. But such an incidental facilitation of private conduct
is not substantial and is not within the ambit of the entanglement exception. See supra Section III.B.2. and
accompanying text; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (holding that sale of a
liquor license to a private organization was not substantial facilitation of private conduct).
126. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); but see Burton, 365 U.S. at 724–
25 (explaining that a small private business such as a restaurant may still be a state actor when it engages
in a mutually beneficial lease of a business space from the state).
127. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 723.
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circumstances could be referred to as quasi-state actors. 128 Such circumstances will
arise when security personnel operating the Patscan are doing so on private property and are privately employed but the state is still significantly involved in some
fashion. Sports stadiums, large event venues, and casinos are some examples of
places that may fit into this category. In these cases, the courts will apply the public
function and entanglement exceptions to determine whether the actions of the private actor are considered state action. 129 A difference in holdings between two district courts regarding sports stadiums demonstrates how the courts have narrowed
the state action doctrine over the past few decades.
In Ludtke v. Kuhn, the New York Yankees Clubhouse prohibited female reporters from entering the Yankees’ locker room to interview players immediately after
games. 130 A female reporter brought a discrimination claim against the New York
Yankees and several other defendants, and one of the key issues was whether the
clubhouse policy was state action. 131 The New York Southern District Court looked
to the entanglement exception in holding that the policy was state action. 132 The
court found it significant that the Yankee Clubhouse was leasing the portion of the
stadium from the City of New York, which was the owner of the entire Yankees Stadium. 133 Comparing the case to Burton, the court emphasized the “symbiotic relationship” between the Yankee Clubhouse and the City of New York. 134
In contrast, in Stark v. Seattle Seahawks, the Washington Western District
Court held that private security forces conducting pat-down searches of fans entering the Seahawks’ stadium was not state action. 135 Two fans, who were subjected
to the pat-down searches, brought a civil action for deprivation of their Fourth
Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 136 This court also looked to the
128. Under Burton, such actors would undoubtedly be considered state actors. See generally Burton, 365 U.S. at 715.
129. See supra Section II.B.
130. Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 87–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
131. Id. at 87–88, 93. The other defendants included “Bowie Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball;
Leland MacPhail, President of the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs . . . The Mayor of the City
of New York; The Commissioner of Parks and Recreation for the City of New York; and The Director of the
Economic Development Administration of The City of New York.” Id. at 88.
132. Id. at 93.
133. Id. The City of New York owned the stadium because it had exercised eminent domain to
acquire it several years earlier. Id. at 92.
134. Ludtke, 461 F. Supp. at 93. The court further explained:
The facts of the case at hand so nearly resemble those of Burton that there can be little doubt
that state action exists . . . Here, as in Burton, the place where the discriminatory acts occurred
is owned by the state (the City of New York) and leased pursuant to special legislative provisions
to the Yankees. In this case, as in Burton, the facility involved is maintained and improved with
the use of public funds. The Court noted in Burton that the relationship of the public and private
entities in that case placed them in a relationship of interdependence. The same observation
can be made on these facts, where the annual rentals to be paid to the City for use of the stadium depend directly on the drawing power of Yankee games, and the City has in turn invested
substantial sums of public money to enhance that drawing power by modernizing and improving the stadium itself.
Id. at 93–94.
135. Stark v. Seattle Seahawks, No. C06-1719JLR, 2007 WL 1821017 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2007).
136. This is known as a “Section 1983” claim. See id. at *1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The
action was brought against several named defendants, including The Seattle Seahawks (NFL team), Football
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entanglement exception in determining whether the private action could be fairly
attributed to the state. 137 Just like in Ludtke, the plaintiffs pointed to evidence of a
symbiotic relationship between the private actors and the Stadium Authority, 138 including the fact that the private actors leased the stadium from the Stadium Authority. 139 They also pointed to the fact that the Stadium Authority shared revenue
with the private actors and had “an equity stake in the Seahawks.” 140 But, relying
on Supreme Court precedent, the court took a narrow approach to the state action
doctrine, explaining that a symbiotic relationship is only shown when the specific
action in question is mutually beneficial to both the state and private actors. 141 In
the court’s view, the entanglement exception did not apply because the Stadium
Authority did not benefit from the pat-down searches. 142
In light of this narrowing of the state action doctrine, it seems unlikely that
the Court would find use of the Patscan in sports stadiums or similar venues to be
considered state action so long as the security personnel are private employees and
the facility is being leased by a private actor. The possible benefits of a scan from
the Patscan are the same as those from a pat-down search. The purpose is to detect
concealed weapons and protect the safety of everyone within the stadium or
venue. If promoting the safety of patrons does not benefit the government owner
of the facility simply because a private company has leased it from the government
and employed its own private security personnel, then it is unlikely that use of the
Patscan in this context would be considered state action. As long as the entanglement exception is narrowly construed to require that the specific actions being challenged be the source of the “symbiotic” relationship between the private and state
actor, use of the Patscan in sports stadiums and similar venues likely is not state
action.
The public function exception offers another possible route to a finding of
state action, but it has been met with mixed results across jurisdictions. When a
private security officer has plenary power to make arrests under state law, some
jurisdictions have found that the authority makes him a state actor. 143 In circuits
Northwest (the owner of the Seahawks), First & Goal (“a Washington corporation that leases [the stadium]
for the benefit of the Seahawks”), the Stadium Authority (a public entity that owns the stadium), and Lorraine Hine (the Chair of the Stadium Authority’s Board of Directors). Stark, 2007 WL 1821017, at *1–2.
137. Stark, 2007 WL 1821017, at *7–8.
138. The Stadium Authority was a public entity created by The Stadium Act for the purpose of
constructing, owning, remodeling, and operating the Seahawks Stadium. Id. at *1–2.
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *5–6.
142. Id. at *6–7. One might argue that the Stadium Authority benefited from the pat-down
searches because it made fans more likely to purchase tickets because it made them feel more secure. More
ticket purchases would mean more revenue and an increase in the value of the Stadium Authority’s equity
stake. In fact, the plaintiffs did make that argument, but the court dismissed the apparent benefit as “pure
speculation.” Stark, 2007 WL 1821017, at *6.
143. See, e.g., Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
plenary arrest authority transforms a private security guard into a state actor via the public function
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that have held that private security forces were state actors, the courts reasoned
that a private security officer with plenary arrest authority is serving a public function because police power is one “traditionally and exclusively” held by the state. 144
Of course, in those jurisdictions, the issue can probably be avoided entirely by
simply not providing private security forces with plenary arrest authority. Instead,
the private security officers can exercise their power to make a citizens’ arrest without being considered state actors. 145 Absent a Supreme Court opinion addressing
this split, a finding of state action under the public function exception may depend
on the jurisdiction in which the private security forces with arrest authority are using the Patscan. This potential for a patchwork of jurisdictions holding that use of
the Patscan by private security personnel either is or is not state action is less than
desirable considering the fundamental constitutional rights at stake.
Finally, the third category consists of circumstances where state action is
clearly present. Such circumstances arise when the security personnel operating the
Patscan are themselves government agents. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 146 in airports, employees at state-run public schools, state and federal law enforcement officers, and security personnel in government buildings all
fall into this category of state actors. When the Patscan is used under the circumstances that arise in this category, there is no question as to the presence of state
action or the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Is Use of the Patscan a Search?
Regardless of the circumstances under which the Patscan is used, the method
the device uses to scan an individual remains the same. 147 If using the Patscan to
scan an individual in an airport is a search, so too is using the Patscan to scan someone in a sports stadium or on a street corner. The question then, is whether bouncing microwaves off an individual and interpreting the reflected waves to determine
whether they are carrying a weapon constitutes a search.
i. Physical Trespass Test
A scan from the Patscan likely does not physically trespass upon constitutionally protected areas in the sense contemplated in Jones or Olmstead. The trespass
and search at issue in Jones was the attaching of a GPS tracking device to the undercarriage of an individual’s vehicle and the subsequent tracking of his location. 148
In holding that installment of the tracking device was a search, the Court
exception). But see United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 688–89 (4th Cir. 2010) (disagreeing with the holding
from Romanski and finding that plenary arrest authority alone is not enough to change a private citizen to
a state actor).
144. See Romanski, 428 F.3d at 637, 651.
145. See Day, 591 F.3d at 689.
146. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is a federal agency created by Congress to
handle security at airports and improve security for other modes of transportation. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 §101, 49 U.S.C. §114(a), (d)–(e) (2012).
147. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10 (explaining how the Patscan
operates to scan individuals).
148. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
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emphasized the physical nature of reaching under the vehicle to place the tracking
device. 149 In Olmstead, the Court held that wiretapping an individual’s phone was
not a search under the physical trespass test so long as the government agent did
not step onto the individual’s property (a constitutionally protected area) to tap the
telephone line. 150 Olmstead illustrates the principle that not only must the act in
question be physical in nature, it must also intrude upon a constitutionally protected area. 151 Olmstead likely would be decided differently if it were before the
Court today, because the modern Court is equipped with both the physical trespass
test and the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test from Katz. 152 But, Olmstead is
still useful in illustrating the nature of the physical trespass test reinvigorated by
Jones.
The Patscan is used to scan both an individual’s body and those items that she
is wearing or carrying. 153 An individual’s “person” is one of the protected areas enumerated within the Fourth Amendment, 154 and “has . . . been extended to include
clothing, items in pockets, undergarments, socks, and other extensions of the
body.” 155 The Court has not provided a universal definition of “effects,” 156 but it has
held that parcels, 157 luggage, 158 and vehicles, 159 are all constitutionally protected
“effects.” The Court has also distinguished that effects are personal property, not
real property. 160 Between the Court’s slightly expansive interpretation of “person”
and its holding that luggage and parcels are effects, it seems clear that at minimum,
an individual’s body and the objects she is wearing or possessing are constitutionally protected areas. Thus, when scanning an individual for concealed weapons, the
Patscan is being used on the constitutionally protected areas contemplated by the
Court.
The problem is that the scan conducted by the Patscan is not physical in nature. Unlike in Jones where the government agent physically intruded upon an individual’s “effect” by reaching under the vehicle to attach a GPS tracking device, the
Patscan merely sends and receives electronic signals, requiring no physical intrusion
upon the individual’s “person” or “effects.” 161 Since the Patscan does not physically
149. Id. at 410–11.
150. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464–66. Perhaps if the telephone line was owned by the defendant
the wiretapping would have constituted a physical trespass in the eyes of the Court.
151. See id.
152. See supra Section III.C.ii.
153. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting “persons, houses, papers, and effects”).
155. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 592
(2017).
156. Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property
Due Protection, 125 YALE L. J. 946, 960 (2016).
157. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 144 (1984).
158. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705–06 (1983).
159. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
160. Brady, supra note 156.
161. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05; PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.
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intrude upon the individual’s “person” or “effects,” its electronic scans are not
searches under the physical trespass test from Jones. Perhaps in anticipation of devices such as the Patscan, Justice Scalia explained in Jones that “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass . . . remain subject
to Katz analysis.” 162
ii. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
A scan from the Patscan is a search under the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz. The first prong of the test, that the individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy, will almost always be satisfied by the fact that the individual
carrying a concealed weapon chose to conceal it. 163 The second prong of the test is
more complex. This prong of Katz, if interpreted literally, gives rise to a troublesome
question. Can an individual ever have a reasonable, societally recognized expectation of privacy in the objects he carries into an area he knows is protected by security? While this question can be asked in the context of security at government
buildings, sports stadiums, schools, or any other areas in which the Patscan might
be used, airports are particularly useful in illustrating this concept.
In our post-9/11 world, everyone who has flown and many who have never
flown understand that to get into the boarding area of an airport they will have to
pass through a security checkpoint. The current routine is essentially the same at
every airport and is easily described: arrive two hours before your flight, get in line
at the security checkpoint, take off your shoes, empty your pockets into a bin, get
out your laptop or iPad and put it in a separate bin, place your bag on the conveyer
belt to be x-rayed, and walk through the metal detector or millimeter wave machine. If a man walks into an airport expecting to get on a plane and he is carrying
a revolver in his briefcase, we, as a society, expect him to be discovered. Substitute
out the metal detector or millimeter wave machine for the Patscan, and that expectation does not change. Assuming all of this is true, how could we possibly conclude
that society is prepared to recognize the man’s expectation of privacy as reasonable?
The courts, even before 9/11, acknowledged that interpreting Katz in this way
leads to problematic results. 164 In response to the government’s assertion that an
individual could not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy” in his carry-on luggage, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned:
[The second requirement from Katz] does not mean that any kind of governmental intrusion is permissible if it has occurred often enough. The government could not avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by notifying the public that all telephone lines will be tapped, or that all homes
will be searched. ‘Airport searches’ are not outside the Amendment simply
162. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (emphasis in original).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973) (discussing whether the
first requirement of the Katz test is met: “Clearly the first requirement was satisfied in this case: appellant
relied on the privacy of his briefcase to conceal his gun.”).
164. See generally Davis, 482 F.2d at 905 (declining to interpret the second prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in this manner); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974)
(explaining that the concept has “little analytical significance”).
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because they are being conducted at all airports. In none of the Supreme
Court decisions excluding searches or seizures from the Fourth Amendment on the authority of Katz was the result based on such a rationale. Rather, in each case the individual's alleged reasonable expectation of privacy was negated on some other, independent, ground. 165
In other words, society’s reasonable expectations of privacy cannot be diminished simply because the governmental intrusions are common or recurring. Other
circuits have discussed this issue in a comparable manner. 166 After 9/11, the cogency of this line of reasoning is even more evident. While the threat of hijacking
and terrorism do have an impact on the Fourth Amendment search analysis, that
impact is on the part of the analysis focused on the reasonableness of a search, not
whether a search has occurred in the first place. Thus, whether in an airport, or
passing through security anywhere else, an individual still has an objective expectation of privacy when it comes to the items he has concealed on his body or in his
luggage. 167 Since both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonable expectation of privacy test are met when an individual is screened by security, use of the
Patscan to conduct that screening is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
An additional ground for finding that use of the Patscan to scan individuals for
concealed weapons constitutes a search can be found in the treatment of metal
detectors by the circuit courts. In United States v. Epperson, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that use of a metal detector was a search when it was used
to scan an individual about to board a plane. 168 The court in Epperson did not engage in the two-part analysis described in Katz. 169 Instead, the court stated simply
that using a metal detector, “a government officer, without permission, discerned
metal on Epperson’s person.” 170 The court went on to explain that “the very purpose and function of a [metal detector]: [is] to search for metal and disclose its
presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy.” 171 Numerous
165. Davis, 482 F.2d at 905.
166. See, e.g., United States v. De Los Santos Ferrer, 999 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1993) (“We think that
the Fourth Amendment issue is a difficult one. To be sure, a traveler who has any experience knows that
luggage at airports is now commonly x-rayed for guns or explosives and that requests at the checkpoint to
open the luggage are not uncommon. At the same time, these are administrative searches conducted for a
limited purpose and this limited—and exigent—purpose has been the basis for allowing the searches en
masse, without a warrant and without probable cause. There is at least some basis for concern about the
government’s falling-domino approach, by which each intrusion diminishes privacy expectations enough to
permit a further infringement.”).
167. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 905 (explaining that the second part of the Katz test is satisfied); Albarado, 495 F.2d at 802–03 (determining that screening a person and his luggage is a search whether done
manually, with a metal detector, or with an x-ray).
168. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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opinions from the other circuits cite to Epperson for this principle without engaging
in the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis themselves. 172
The reasoning applied to metal detectors in Epperson seemingly could be applied to the Patscan as well. Like a metal detector, whose purpose and function “is
to search for metal and disclose its presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy,” the Patscan’s purpose and function is to search for weapons
and disclose their presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy. 173 In other words, metal detectors search for metal, the Patscan searches for
weapons, and both are considered “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
C. Is Using the Patscan to Search an Individual Reasonable?
Turning to the reasonableness portion of our analysis, only the third category
of circumstances, where there are clear state actors, need be evaluated. As explained in Part IV.A., sports stadiums, large event venues, casinos, restaurants, private clubs, and movie theaters are all possible places for the Patscan to be used that
likely would fall outside the bounds of the state action doctrine’s exceptions in their
current form. Even if the government owns the property on which the private business is located and leases it to a private actor, enforcement of security using the
Patscan, or otherwise, is outside the scope of the entanglement and public function
exceptions in all but a very limited number of circumstances. 174
The sections below analyze use of the Patscan for reasonableness in those circumstances where clear state action is present. Presumably, the government will
not have obtained a warrant in any of the situations in which the Patscan might be
used to search individuals. Therefore, reasonableness of the Patscan search will depend primarily on how well it fits within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. 175 The two exceptions that are most applicable in the context of the
Patscan are the administrative search and special needs exceptions. In both contexts, we will see that the courts have given substantial weight to the government’s
goal of preventing violence.

172. See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 803 (“Even the unintrusive [metal detector] walk-through is a
search in that it searches for and discloses metal items within areas most intimate to the person where
there is a normal expectation of privacy.”) (citing Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770); United States v. Slocum, 464
F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972) (“The short answer to defendant’s challenge directed against use of the
[metal detector] is provided by United States v. Epperson . . . .”); Horton v. Goose Creek Independent Sch.
Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770); United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d
1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980) (comparing x-rays and metal detectors and determining that both are searches);
United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that scans with a metal detector have been “deemed a Fourth Amendment search”) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984).
173. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17.
174. Those circumstances being when the challenger can prove that enforcement of security directly benefits the government actor, see supra note 142 and accompanying text, which is unlikely in most
cases, or in some jurisdictions where it has been held that private security officers with plenary arrest authority granted by the state are considered state actors via the public function exception, see supra note
143 and accompanying text, which is easily avoided.
175. See supra Section III.D.
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i. The Administrative Search Exception
An administrative search is a search “conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime[.]” 176 Such a search may be permissible notwithstanding a lack of probable cause. 177 To be constitutional, administrative
searches must be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 178 "Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." 179
But an administrative search should be “as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it.” 180
a. Airports
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the administrative search exception applies to searches made at security checkpoints in airports. Nor has it ruled
specifically on whether the use of a metal detector or millimeter wave scanner to
search individuals in airports is reasonable. However, the circuit courts have held
that use of a metal detector in an “airport screening search” is constitutionally reasonable under the administrative search exception. 181 The airport screening search
is an administrative search because it is “conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,” that purpose being to “prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent
hijackings.” 182
Looking to the first half of the balancing test, the government’s need to search
individuals for weapons in airports is quite clear. In 1973, the Ninth Circuit joined
several other circuits in determining that “the [government’s] need to prevent airline hijacking is unquestionably grave and urgent.” 183 In our post 9/11 world, the
government’s need to prevent weapons or explosives from being brought aboard
aircraft is even more pressing. 184

176. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 910.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., id. at 912; United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–62 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruling
the part of Davis that requires consent, implied or express, for constitutional airport searches, but otherwise
reaffirms that airport searches are reasonable).
182. See Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)).
183. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910. See also United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.
1972).
184. See Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960–61.
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As for the other side of the balancing test, the courts have looked to the capabilities of “current technology” when evaluating the search’s intrusiveness. 185 Because of the government’s pressing need for airport searches, they have been held
constitutionally reasonably provided they are “no more extensive nor intensive
than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives . . . [and are] confined in good faith to that purpose.” 186 In this
respect, the Patscan may actually have a distinct advantage over the conventional
metal detector and the millimeter wave machine. The Patscan is more precise than
a metal detector because it only detects weapons and explosives, whereas metal
detectors detect all kinds of metal objects and millimeter wave machines are intended to detect all concealed objects. 187 It could be argued that this increased precision makes the Patscan search less extensive than a search using a metal detector
or millimeter wave machine. At any rate, the government’s overwhelming need to
prevent the hijacking of aircraft means that use of the Patscan to search people for
weapons and explosives in an airport is, in all likelihood, reasonable and constitutional.
b. Government Facilities or Buildings
The administrative search exception’s applicability to government buildings,
such as courthouses, capitol buildings, and city halls, is substantially the same as it
is to airports. The government has a legitimate goal, distinct from general crime
prevention, of “prevent[ing] destruction and injury in government facilities.” 188 The
fact that the Patscan only searches for weapons and explosives means that in theory
it is less intrusive than alternatives, such as metal detectors and pat-down searches.
Thus, similar to airports, the government’s interest in preventing destruction and
injury outweighs the potential invasion of privacy.
ii. The Special Needs Exception in Public Schools
The Supreme Court has stated that warrantless searches that are not supported by probable cause can still be constitutional “when special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” 189 The Court has also held that such “special needs” are
present in the context of public schools. 190 When applying the special needs exception, a balance must be struck between the students’ legitimate expectations of
privacy and the legitimate need for schools to maintain order and a safe learning
environment. 191 In striking this balance, the court must look at “(1) the nature of
the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes; (2) the character of the intrusion, [including] . . . whether the invasion of privacy is minimal or significant, and
185. Id. at 962.
186. Id.
187. See supra Section II.B.
188. See United States v. Kerr, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1128 (E.D. Wash. 2017).
189. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
190. Id.
191. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–40 (1985).
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(3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the means for meeting it.” 192
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld a urinalysis drug test that was part of
a district-wide drug policy authorizing random drug tests of student athletes. 193 The
students were found to have diminished privacy interests because of their status as
public-school students. 194 As for the character of the intrusion, the collection of
urine samples was not a significant invasion of privacy because it was done in the
privacy of a restroom and the samples were screened only for drugs, not underlying
medical conditions of the students. 195 Finally, the nature of the concern, deterring
drug use by schoolchildren, was important if not compelling. 196
The Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the reasonableness of using
of a metal detector or millimeter wave scanner to conduct entry searches in
schools. Although, some states have taken matters into their own hands. Tennessee
has expressly authorized the use of metal detectors in schools through a statute. 197
State courts in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Florida, and California have approved the use of metal detectors in schools. 198 In People v. Pruitt, an Illinois appeals court addressed the issue of metal detector searches in schools. 199 The court
in Pruitt emphasized that the intrusiveness of requiring students to pass through a
metal detector is minimal because it did not involve any physical touching. 200 As to
the government’s needs, the court held that the school’s “special needs” included
preventing violence in schools. 201 In doing so, the court reflected on the loss of innocence in schools that its holding represented:
We long for the time when children did not have to pass through metal
detectors on their way to class, when hall monitors were other children,
not armed guards, when students dressed for school without worrying
about gang colors. Those were the days when sharp words, crumpled balls
of paper, and, at worst, the bully's fists were the weapons of choice. 202
However, the court went on to state: “[j]udges cannot ignore what everybody
else knows: violence and the threat of violence are present in the public schools.” 203
Ultimately, in balancing the privacy interest of the student and the school’s “special
192. People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ill. 1996) (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654–63).
193. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664–65.
194. Id. at 656–57.
195. Id. at 658–60.
196. Id. at 661.
197. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4207 (2017).
198. See Robert S. Johnson, Counterpoint: Metal Detector Searches: An Effective Means to Help
Keep Weapons Out Of Schools, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 197, 202 (2000).
199. See People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E. 2d 540 (1996).
200. Id. at 547.
201. See id. at 545 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 546.
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need” to prevent violence, the court held that the suspicionless metal detector
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 204
While the Illinois Appeals Court has limited jurisdiction, its analysis of the use
of metal detectors in schools is still instructive on the issue of implementing Patscan
searches in public schools. The reduced privacy interest of public school students
and the “special need” for prevention of violence in schools remain the same. The
Patscan is similar to a metal detector in the fact that neither device requires a physical touching of the student during the search. Under this line of reasoning, replacing the metal detector with the Patscan likely would not change the outcome of
Pruitt. Thus, a limited number of jurisdictions have likely already found that a search
using a device such as the Patscan to screen students for weapons is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Based on the Supreme Court’s finding that urinalysis
drug testing of students was reasonable in light of the government’s special need
to prevent students from using drugs, it seems likely that the Court would also uphold the use of the Patscan given the government’s special need of preventing violence in schools. 205
V. CONCLUSION
Security technology is going to continue to advance, both in sophistication and
capability. The Patscan is just an example of the incredible advancements technology has made in the first part of the twenty-first century. This relatively small device
has the potential to revolutionize the look and feel of security checkpoints as we
know them. With the enhancement of security technology, however, comes the increased risk of intrusions on the right to privacy. And the current jurisprudential
landscape is filled with pitfalls, capable of undermining privacy rights in the face of
new technology. The narrowing of both the public function exception 206 and entanglement exception 207 to the state action requirement is one such danger. As technology advances, the blurred lines between state and private actors will become
increasingly important. A robust state action doctrine would subject quasi-state actors to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, ensuring that privacy interests are
at least balanced against government and security interests. A murky and narrow
state action doctrine will serve to allow private security forces, equipped with advanced security technology such as the Patscan, to search individuals regardless of
whether the government could constitutionally do so. Private security officers and
guards already outnumber sworn law enforcement officers more than two to
one. 208 Advanced security technology will put a large amount of power in their
hands. Because of a narrow state action doctrine, they will be predominately unrestricted by the Fourth Amendment.
As for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself, the Court has created a patchwork of recognized privacy interests in the context of new technologies. But the
204. Id. at 547.
205. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
206. See supra Section III.B.i.
207. See supra Section III.B.ii.
208. See Amy Goldstein, More Security Firms Getting Police Powers/Some See Benefits to Public
Safety, But Others Are Wary, SFGATE (Jan. 7, 2007), https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/More-securityfirms-getting-police-powers-Some-2625549.php.
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creeping expansion of the number and scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement threatens to swallow the Fourth Amendment and its protections. As the
twenty-first century progresses, the Patscan and other advancements in technology
will continue to make the world a safer place. But they will also strain our current
understanding of the right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment. Justice Scalia was right: “[t]here can be no clarity in this area unless
we make up our minds, and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we take.” 209 If “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” 210 perhaps it is time to reconsider our sacrificing of privacy for the sake
of security. For “privacy erodes first at the margins, but once eliminated, its protections are lost for good, and the resultant damage is rarely, if ever, undone.” 211

209.
210.
403 (2006)).
211.

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 383,
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004).

